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Climate change is likely to affect the pattern of some disasters in the Pacific, and therefore 
the organisations and systems involved in disaster response. This research, conducted by 
researchers at the University of Technology, Sydney, focused on how the immediate 
humanitarian needs following disasters are met by various stakeholders, both in the 
affected country and those offering support from outside. The research sought to 
understand the adaptive capacity of both Pacific island countries (PICs) and Australia’s 
disaster response to a potential increase in disasters driven by climate change. This 
report provides results for the Cook Islands – one of four case study countries selected for 
deeper analysis. See institute websites for our full research report which includes details 
of all case study countries. 
 
The research was guided by the following research questions: 
1. What constitutes the ‘disaster response system’ (DRS) for the immediate 
humanitarian needs post-disaster (health care, water and sanitation, psychosocial 
needs and food and nutrition) in each of the 4 case study PICs (including the 
Australian component to this response)? 
2. How do various inter-organisational determinants serve to strengthen or reduce 
adaptive capacity of the ‘disaster response system’? This question considers 
Australia’s response obligations, national, regional and international stakeholders 
and the mechanisms that coordinate their actions, and other regional examples. 
3. Which objective and subjective determinants are most significant in influencing the 
adaptive capacity of the organisations within the ‘disaster response system’? What 
are the characteristics of an organisation with high levels of adaptive capacity? 
 
RESEARCH METHODS AND APPROACH 
 A qualitative methodology, with a strong focus on participatory stakeholder engagement, 
was used for this research. The concept of ‘adaptive capacity ’ was used to assess the 
resilience of individual organisations and the robustness of the broader system of 
response. Specific determinants of adaptive capacity were used to assess the ‘disaster 
response system’ (DRS), comprised of actors and agents from government and non-
government sectors, governance structures and the formal and informal networks that 
support them. Background literature reviews, stakeholder workshops and key informant 
interviews with Australian, New Zealand and Pacific based stakeholders within the 
disaster, climate change, health and development sectors were used to assess the 
complexities of the DRS in selected Pacific island countries. Emphasis was placed on four 
immediate humanitarian post-disaster needs: health care; water and sanitation, 
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COOK ISLANDS DISASTER RESPONSE SYSTEM  
Key organisations and supporting policies / plans active in supporting disaster response, 
as identified by in-country stakeholders in Cook Islands include the following: 
Key Organisations Key Legislation, Policies and Plans 
 National Disaster Risk Management Council 
(NDRMC) 
 Emergency Management Cook Islands 
(EMCI) 
 Response Executive (comprised of Police 
Commissioner, Ministry of Financial and 
Economic Management, Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Planning, Cook Islands 
Meteorological Service, EMCI) 
 Ministry of Health 
 Ministry of Outer Island Administration 
 Cook Islands Red Cross Society 
 Cook Islands Civil Society Organisation 
(CICSO) 
 NZAID 
 UN Agencies (including UNDAC) 
 Churches 
 National Disaster Risk Management Policy 
2005 
 Te Kaveinga Nui 2020 and the National 
Sustainable Development Plan 2011-2015 
(NSDP) 
 National Disaster Risk Management (DRM) 
Act 2007 
 DRM Regulations 2010 
 Joint National Action Plan for Disaster Risk 
Management and Climate Change Adaptation 
2011-2015 (JNAP) 
 National Disaster Risk Management 
Arrangement 2009 (the Arrangement) 
 
Some flexibility existed in terms of the stakeholders involved in the Response Executive 
depending on the specific details of the disaster. While this showed a degree of 
adaptiveness and flexibility, evidence from past events showed that clearer guidelines 
were needed to ensure decisions can be made quickly, particularly surrounding requests 
for external assistance. 
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 
A summary of organisations and response mechanisms in the Cook Islands relating to the 
four post-disaster humanitarian needs covered in this research is provided below. 
Health Care Psychosocial Needs  
 Policy was in place to guide health workforce, 
but knowledge of policies was affected by high 
rates of staff turnover. 
 No clear guidelines existed for the 
coordination of in-coming health personnel but 
mechanisms were being developed to deal 
with this. 
 The health sector was a stakeholder in the 
DRS and was relatively well organised since 
improvements in the clarification of roles and 
responsibilities. 
 The health sector had clear leadership and 
strong partnerships with NGOs and donors.  
 Health workforce and material capacity was 
inadequate particularly in times of disaster. 
However, local health professionals were 
keen to be able to provide care but required 
material resources to be able to meet this 
responsibility.  
 Some level of disaster training was available 
 The Cook Islands had inadequate capacity to 
meet post-disaster psychosocial needs, as 
acknowledged by many Cook Island 
interviewees. 
 There were uncertain roles, responsibilities 
and expectations between government 
ministries regarding psychosocial support. 
 Dedicated and trained personnel were found 
to be lacking in the MoH. 
 Psychosocial support was needed for 
communities affected by disasters, including 
key community leaders who are important 
points of contact for incoming support. 
 Psychosocial support was also needed for 
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for the health workforce.  
Food & Nutrition Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) 
 Immediate food and nutrition needs post-
disaster were not raised as a priority amongst 
Cook Island interviewees. 
 The mention of food and nutrition needs 
usually led interviewees to mention longer 
term food security issues. 
 The MoH indicated that provision of 
immediate food needs were not funded by 
government, rather the staff themselves. 
 Past events revealed that some of the food 
and nutritional needs can be sustained from 
crops surviving disaster damage, however this 
did not last long and depended on the extent 
of damage. 
 WASH as an ongoing development issue, as 
well as a post-disaster need received the 
greatest attention when compared to the other 
three humanitarian needs. 
 Several key DRS organisations prioritised 
WASH and were relatively well equipped to 
source materials and trained personnel either 
internally or externally. 
 The Ministry of Infrastructure and Planning 
(MoIP) was a key government agency with a 
focus on WASH infrastructure in disasters. 
 Red Cross was the key organisation outside of 
government for WASH and had a dedicated 
team and equipment for WASH. 
KEY DETERMINANTS OF ADAPTIVE CAPACITY 
As a country with a small and scattered population across vast distances, key individuals, 
their relationships and trust were crucial determinants of adaptive capacity. This issue 
permeated the other key determinants of adaptive capacity, with positions of leadership 
and the governance of the DRS supported by few personnel. These few people’s 
perceptions of risk were seen to drive the progress and pathway towards efforts of risk 
reduction and addressing key issues surrounding resilience. 
Communications, relationships, information and knowledge 
Communications, relationships, information and knowledge in the Cook Islands centred 
around personal relationships and trust between key 
individuals, which was particularly pertinent given the small 
population of the Cook Islands.  
Adaptive capacity can be supported by this key 
determinant so long as key individuals within the DRS have a clear understanding of the 
roles and responsibilities of others and information flows are unobstructed. Informal 
modes of operating within this system are particularly important and also rely heavily on 
the existence of trust and strong relationships.  
Leadership, management and governance 
Key DRS decision making bodies need to be comprised of individuals who are recognised 
as leaders. In the Cook Islands, this acknowledgement of 
leadership was in part dependent on the (formal and 
informal) relationships and levels of trust between 
individuals, as described above. Effective leadership was 
also dependent on the capacity of individuals (or 
organisations) to fulfil their obligations, both in terms of 
sufficient personnel and financial capacity to undertake 
necessary activities and initiatives. 
Some uncertainty in the broader leadership of decision makers was present in the Cook 
Islands, including mechanisms surrounding requests for overseas disaster assistance and 
who is included on key decision making bodies. This could constrain adaptive capacity as 
it had the potential to delay requests for post disaster international assistance.  
“Overseas organisations want 
to help but don’t know how, so 
they do an assessment.” 
Because of their 
[population] size, we are 
relying on individuals 
rather than institutions so if 
a strong person goes then 
you lose a lot.” 
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Past events also revealed a lack of coordination of disaster assessments in the Cook 
Islands, both from national and international responding organisations. Clarification of 
roles and responsibilities of all DRS agents (including those from overseas) was needed 
to ensure efficiency in response and minimised duplication of efforts. Adaptive capacity 
can be enhanced with a streamlined process for disaster assessments, as support can be 
provided quicker, reducing potential medium to longer term impacts. 
Capacity (human resource, financial and technical) 
Capacity challenges (in terms of human, financial and technical resources) in the Cook 
Islands were found to generally constrain adaptive capacity due to limitations of access to 
a range of assets. Perceptions of levels of capacity, 
and what was considered adequate, varied amongst 
research participants, with some indicating high 
degrees of internal human resource capacity. This 
implies that Cook Islanders wanted to draw on all of 
their own capacity first, prior to accepting external 
assistance. External assistance in times of disaster 
should acknowledge capacity (both existing and gaps) 
and always act to build skills, experience and knowledge throughout all stages of the 
disaster management cycle.  
Some capacity issues have been addressed in recent years, e.g. immediate financial 
capacity through the Disaster Trust Fund. However, a future focus towards capacity 
building across all sectors needs to be mainstreamed, with innovative approaches sought 
to ensure skills are not lost when key individuals move on. The flexible use of the Disaster 
Trust Fund (using it for DRR or disaster preparedness) was identified as a way to enact a 
future focus on disaster response.  
Risk perceptions 
The perceptions of disaster risk and climate change 
were relatively consistent across the Cook Islands’ 
DRS. Most respondents agreed that climate change 
was shifting the baseline risk to a world with potentially 
more unpredictable and severe weather. What differed 
across the DRS was the degree to which this 
perception of risk had led to actions to reduce risk. 
Those more directly related to the issue (e.g. EMCI and 
the Met Service) had the advantage since managing risk was core to their work. Other 
sectors believed themselves to be more distanced from the issue, thus less concerned 
about taking steps to develop policy or plans for disaster response. Adaptive capacity 
could therefore be somewhat constrained, as all stakeholders were not (for various 
reasons) prioritising risk reduction and preparedness as part of their work. 
Conclusion 
Relationships and trust were key to an effective and adaptable system of disaster 
response in the Cook Islands. With low institutional capacity due to a small population, 
efficiency in disaster response required the smooth flow of information between 
responding agencies, who in turn needed an understanding of the formal and informal 
modes of operating. If relationships were strong, then agents within the DRS were aware 
of each other’s roles, responsibilities, capacity and gaps, which in turn led to a legitimate 
and credible governance structure.  
“We use what resources we have – 
money and connections – to make 
things happen, and we have 
become clever about this over the 
years. We don't say we don't have 
money, we can't do it, we find what 
we have to make things happen”. 
“If people are focused on disaster risk 
reduction then there is a possibility that 
there will be no disaster. That will make 
our work easy. If they don’t do their 
jobs, then there will definitely be a 
disaster. And in terms of preparedness 
I am 100% behind that I think we 
should be prepared at all times”. 
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Incoming support to the Cook Islands in times of disaster also needed an awareness of 
the modes of operating, including issues surrounding culture and traditional governance 
structures. By doing so, external assistance can work towards building adaptive capacity 
in ways which are more sustainable and aligned with Cook Islands cultural practices. Past 
events have revealed some gaps in the capacity and coordination of the Cook Islands’ 
DRS, and some steps have been taken to overcome them, for example the establishment 
of the Disaster Trust Fund. 
The capacity of the health sector is highly constrained in times of disasters, however, it 
was clear that Cook Islanders were keen to draw on existing capacity and be supported 
by external assistance only when gaps are evident. Leadership of key responding bodies, 
such as EMCI, was crucial for future adaptive capacity, however capacity constrains the 
ability of some organisations to take necessary steps in implementing important initiatives. 
Policies and plans were needed to ensure disaster response efforts (including disaster 
assessments) were appropriately coordinated; however some flexibility is needed given 
the nature of disasters. Such policies and plans need adequate consultation of all relevant 
stakeholders to ensure that a collective level of ownership exists, resulting in an inclusive 
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COOK ISLANDS COUNTRY REPORT 
1. SETTING THE CONTEXT 
Climate change is likely to affect the pattern of some disasters in the Pacific, and therefore 
the organisations and systems involved in disaster response. This research, conducted by 
researchers at the University of Technology, Sydney, focused on how the immediate 
humanitarian needs following disasters are met by various stakeholders, both in the 
affected country and those offering support from outside. The research sought to 
understand the adaptive capacity of both PICs and Australia’s disaster response to a 
potential increase in disasters driven by climate change.  
 
The primary objectives of the research were: 
 To provide recommendations to policy makers and practitioners in the Pacific and 
Australian disaster and emergency response sectors on current adaptive capacity of 
PICs to climate related disasters (e.g. tropical cyclones, floods, droughts, storm 
surge), and identify the resources, policies and systems needed in the coming years 
to enhance this capacity;  
 To inform improved planning and more effective response through analysis of the 
Australian emergency services and related organisations’ capacity, role and 
obligations to assist PICs in times of disaster. 
 
The research was conducted in 2012 and had a strong focus on participatory stakeholder 
engagement through extensive interviews, workshops and guidance from a Project 
Reference Group. Four case study countries (Fiji, Cook Islands, Vanuatu and Samoa) 
were chosen for deeper investigation of the range of issues present in the Pacific. The 
purpose of this report is to provide country specific results of the research for the Cook 
Islands.  
 
The Pacific region is vulnerable to a range of natural hazards including tropical cyclones 
and storms, droughts, earthquakes, tsunami, floods, volcanoes and wave surges. The 
capacity of PICs to cope with these hazards is often challenged, due to their inherent 
vulnerability stemming from the isolation, small size, insularity, environmental factors and 
limited disaster mitigation capacity (Meheux et al., 2007). As such, natural disasters occur 
relatively frequently in the Pacific, with significant economic and social impacts.1  
 
Pacific Forum Leaders have committed to reducing disaster risks through various 
declarations and frameworks, including the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster 
Management (DRR and DM) Framework for Action (SOPAC, 2009). The Pacific DRR and 
DM Framework sets out six themes and includes guiding principles and expected 
outcomes by 2015, and contributes to global progress in achieving goals of the Hyogo 
Framework for Action 2005-2015 – which is the principle international guiding framework 
for disaster risk management (UNISDR, 2005).  
 
In times of disaster, it is the responsibility of the national government to respond to the 
needs of the population. In the Pacific, effective response is made more complex than in 
other regions due to reasons such as (Kennedy and Muller, 2008): 
 Potential remoteness of the affected area 
                                               
1
 Hay and Mimura, 2010; data from EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – 
www.emdat.be – Université Catholique de Louvain – Brussels – Belgium 
2
 Adaptive Capacity - The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate 
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 Relatively small number of people affected (high cost per person due to relatively 
low population density and multiple remote locations) 
 Ability of natural hazards to overwhelm local and national capacity to respond 
 Logistical constraints, affecting timeliness and assessment challenges 
 Coordination challenges of regional organisations  
 
Effective institutions and guiding policies are necessary to provide a coordinated and 
effective response to disasters. Specific indicators important at the national government 
level that are identified as important in effective disaster response include (UNOCHA and 
UNISDR, 2008): 
 A disaster risk reduction and disaster risk management implementation plan based on 
assessment of hazards and risks 
 A national platform to promote coordination and sharing of information, and to 
harmonise capacity 
 Adequate resource allocation across all levels 
 National plans including community capacity and inclusion of specific vulnerable 
groups 
 Disaggregated population data. 
This report takes some of these elements into consideration in an attempt to provide a 
broader understanding of the Cook Islands national capacity to respond to disasters. This 
report seeks to describe specific elements of the Cook Islands DRS and the institutional 
capacity to respond to disasters under a changing climate. 
2. RESEARCH METHODS  
A qualitative methodology, with a strong focus on participatory stakeholder engagement 
was used for this research. The research was guided by a Conceptual Framework (see 
Figure 1) which was developed to provide the scope for this study.  
 8 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
 
The Conceptual Framework describes a cycle of adaptive learning within which the 
adaptive capacity of the DRS is affected by a range of key determinants (Ekstom et al., 
2012). The DRS is defined, in the scope of this research, to be the organisations and 
mechanisms responsible for responding to the four immediate humanitarian needs. The 
DRS is thus comprised of actors and agents from government and non-government 
sectors, governance structures and the formal and informal networks that support them. 
The concept of adaptive capacity2 was used to assess the resilience of individual 
organisations and the robustness of the broader system of response.  
 
Specific determinants of adaptive capacity were used to assess the ‘disaster response 
system’ (DRS). Key determinants were defined as being inter-organisational, intra-
organisational and objective and subjective. A list of the key determinants of adaptive 




 Adaptiveness  
 Access to assets 
 Leadership, management and governance structures 
 Technical capacity, tools, methods and approaches 
 Health workforce education, training and continuing competence 
 Human resource for health governance and management systems 
                                               
2
 Adaptive Capacity - The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate 
variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to 
cope with the consequences. (IPCC TAR, 2001) 
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 Risk Perceptions 
 Self-efficacy beliefs 
 Silo mentality 
 Communications and relationships 
 Strategic vision and outcome expectancy 
 Information and knowledge 
 Elements of social practice 
 
Background literature review, stakeholder workshops and key informant interviews with 
Australian, New Zealand and PIC stakeholders within the disaster, climate change, health 
and development sectors were used to assess the complexities of the DRS in selected 
PICs. Emphasis was placed on four immediate humanitarian needs: health care; water 
and sanitation, psychosocial, food and nutrition.  
 
A total of 15 interviews were completed in the Cook Islands with donors, government and 
non-government organisations (NGOs). Interview and workshop results were drawn 
together with desktop review results during the data analysis phase. Key informant 
interviews’ transcripts were subjected to an inductive thematic analysis for general 
patterns and emerging issues. Interview transcripts were analysed using qualitative 
software, and coded for specific themes based on the conceptual framework. Key 
determinants of adaptive capacity of the disaster response system were identified based 
on triangulation of data from multiple sources. Results were analysed thematically and 
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3. COUNTRY BACKGROUND 
The Cook Islands are comprised of 15 islands, all but two of which are inhabited. With a 
population of 14, 974 (Government of the Cook Islands, 2011a), the country is 
geographically divided into a group of atoll islands in the north (the Northern Group) and 
volcanic islands in the south (the Southern Group) (Government of Cook Islands, 2010). 
The Cook Islands have a total land area of approximately 240km2 across an expanse of 
ocean of 2 million km2 (Government of Cook Islands, 2010) 
3.1 Climate change impacts on disasters in Cook Islands 
Projections for the Cook Islands indicate that temperatures are likely to increase by up to 
1°C by 2030 (high emission scenario), with a wider uncertainty range given for the 
Southern Group (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011). Sea level is 
predicted to rise by between 4-15cm (high emission scenario) by 2030 (Australian Bureau 
of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011). Rainfall projections carry considerable uncertainty in 
the region of the Cook Islands, however in the Southern Group, scientists project an 
increase in the wet season rainfall, while extreme rainfall days are likely to occur more 
frequently (Australian Bureau of Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011). As for the other PICs, 
tropical cyclones in the Cook Islands are predicted to occur less frequently, but there is 
expected to be an increase in the proportion of severe storms (Australian Bureau of 
Meteorology and CSIRO, 2011, Gero et al., 2012). 
3.2 Key disaster response organisations in Cook Islands 
Many organisations are involved in disaster response in the Cook Islands. These are 
described below alongside their roles and responsibilities for disaster response.  
 
The Disaster Risk Management Council is responsible for overseeing disaster 
management in the Cook Islands, including in advising the Prime Minister on declaring 
State of Emergencies or State of Disasters. The Council is comprised of the Prime 
Minister, Financial Secretary, Police Commissioner, Emergency Management Cook 
Islands (EMCI) Director, Public Service Commissioner and Secretary of Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Planning (IFRC, 2012).   
 
The Response Executive is established in the Disaster Risk Management Act and 
directs disaster response. The Response Executive is chaired by the National Controller, 
and also consists of the Police Commissioner, the Financial Secretary, the Secretary 
of Works, the Chief Executive Officer of Ministry of Outer Islands Administration 
and the director of EMCI (Government of the Cook Islands, 2007). 
 
Emergency Management Cook Islands (EMCI) is established as a division under the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Its responsibilities are to coordinate the maintenance 
(including review and testing) and implementation of the disaster risk management plan 
(Government of the Cook Islands, 2007). In addition, EMCI is responsible for advising and 
supporting the Disaster Risk Management Council and assisting the National Coordinator 
in Emergency Operations Centre management in times of disaster (Government of the 
Cook Islands, 2007). The Director of EMCI is appointed by the Prime Minister, and must 
report to the Prime Minister. The Director has all the resources of government at his/her 
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Disaster Response Teams are coordinated at the village, district or island level and are 
tasked with implementing the Disaster Risk Management Plan at the local level, in tandem 
with EMCI (Government of the Cook Islands, 2007). 
 
Island Councils are responsible for establishing Disaster Risk Management Committees 
and a Disaster Coordinator, who liaise with the Director of EMCI on the implementation of 
Disaster Risk Management Plans (Government of the Cook Islands, 2007). Disaster 
Coordinators take on the powers of the Disaster Controller should an event occur in the 
Outer Islands and communications are limited (Government of the Cook Islands, 2007).  
 
The Ministry of Health is responsible for appointing a Health Official to assist the 
Disaster Coordinator. The Ministry of Works is also important in disaster response from 
a coastal hazards and infrastructure perspective (Reed, 2004). 
 
Cook Islands Red Cross Society is active in Cook Islands disaster response, with its 
head office in Rarotonga and branches located on nine of the 12 inhabited islands (IFRC, 
2003).  
 
Cook Islands Civil Society Organisation (CICSO) is the new umbrella group 
representing civil society and NGOs in the Cook Islands. It supersedes Cook Islands 
Association of NGOs (CIANGO) which was disbanded due to financial troubles. 
 
New Zealand Aid Programme is also active in times of disaster response and coordinate 
with national institutional arrangements as necessary. AusAID provides funding for 
development and disaster response through New Zealand Aid Programme, aiming to 
support donor harmonisation efforts. 
 
The institutional structure of these organisations is illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 2: Cook Islands disaster coordination system  
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(Source: pers comms. Carson, 2012) 
 
Important and relevant policies relating to DRR and disaster response in the Cook Islands include: 
• National Disaster Risk Management Policy 2005 (Government of the Cook Islands, 
2005) 
• Te Kaveinga Nui 2020 and the National Sustainable Development Plan 2011-2015 
(NSDP - Government of the Cook Islands, 2011) 
• National Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Act 2007 (Government of the Cook Islands, 
2007) 
• DRM Regulations 2010 (Government of the Cook Islands, 2010) 
• Joint National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change 
Adaptation 2011-2015 (JNAP, Government of the Cook Islands, 2012) 
• National Disaster Risk Management Arrangement 2009 (the Arrangement) 
Box 1 provides an example of past disaster response, and describes some of the roles of 
organisations included above.  
Box 1: Example of past response in Cook Islands 
On February 10th 2010, category three TC Pat hit the island of Aituaki in Cook Islands Southern Group. 
The TC struck after a series of TCs affected the Cook Islands during the month of January, however TC 
Pat was unusual as it came without a sea surge – the typical warning sign of an impending storm. Given 
the early warnings available, upon the TCs impact, the Prime Minister declared a State of Emergency for 
the island of Aituaki and government and Red Cross personnel were dispatched early on the 10th 
February (UNOCHA, 2010). The United Nations received a formal request for assistance from the 
Government of the Cook Islands on 12 February 2010, while New Zealand received its request for 
assistance on 14 February 2010. New Zealand responded to the Cook Islands request with its ‘Operations 
Cook Islands Assist’ mission which involved army and air force delivering emergency aid relief and 
assisting with repairs (NZAID, 2010). Immediate funds of NZ$350,000 were also provided for response, 
while a further NZ$5.5 million were made available for reconstruction (NZAID, 2010). 
 
Opinions amongst interviewees on the coordination of TC Pat varied. For example, an interviewee from 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs noted that:  
 
“There weren’t a lot of existing processes of what we should do… a difficulty was not being sure what was 
expected of us”.  
 
The Ministry of Health had a more positive response with regard to their internal efforts:  
 
“We have a policy in place when there is a cyclone - off duty staff and on duty staff have to assemble”.  
New Zealand Aid Programme noted that “In Polynesia, NZAID acts to position itself as a first responder”. 
Some organisations were clear on their roles and responsibilities and other were not. Perhaps as a result 
of this varied response, a strong opinion was held by one interviewee in particular:  
 
“This event highlighted the completely dysfunctional nature of disaster response in the Cooks” 
(Consultant). This view was held because “Government took a long time to understand what had 
happened… Mobilising emergency response takes too long”. (Consultant)  
 
Delays in response were reportedly due to multiple assessments, and that no supplies could be sent until 
assessment reports were received. This was seen as a frustration by one interviewee in particular, who 
noted:  
 
“There is no imagination of what might be urgently needed – for example water, generators etc.”  
 
Furthermore, regarding the processes needing to be followed:  
 
“The protocols and bureaucracy that we need to go through before action is taken is an impediment”.   
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Lack of finances for disaster response amongst government ministries provided a significant obstacle to 
the provision of immediate needs. For example, an interviewee noted:  
 
“Tiaponga (the Power Company) were on standby for 3-4 days because there was not enough 
money to purchase their airline tickets to get them to Aitutaki.” 
 
The newly established Disaster Trust Fund is an initiative designed to overcome this obstacle, and a direct 
learning from the TC Pat response. Regarding lessons learned, one government interviewee noted that: 
 
“The experience of responding to TC Pat isn’t widely known why and what happened, what 
worked what didn’t. It would be good to have lessons learned in a way that people can digest.”  
 
Red Cross was reported to have a strong presence, especially with their local counterparts on Aitutaki. 
Red Cross reported that their approach was linked in with that of government:  
 
“We were with Minister of Health who had hand-picked a special team to respond that night. We 
met about what roles we would be doing. We briefed ourselves before we sat in with the Island 
Council.”  
 
This highlights that some elements of the initial response was well coordinated, with the Red Cross heavily 
involved. It was also mentioned that a lessons learned exercise was conducted by Red Cross in Aitutaki 
after the TC Pat response, with EMCI in attendance. 
4. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS 
A summary of the DRS capacity relating to the four themes of the research in Cook 
Islands is provided below. 
4.1 Health care 
Health care in the Cook Islands suffers from limitations due to shortages in personnel, 
particularly in times of disaster where staff work long hours without a break. The following 
points summarise the health care situation in the Cook Islands, as noted in Chapter 5).   
 
 Policy is in place to guide health workforce, but knowledge of policies is affected by high 
rates of staff turnover. 
 No clear guidelines exist for the coordination of in-coming health personnel but 
mechanisms are being developed to deal with this. 
 The health sector is a key group of stakeholder in the DRS and is well organised since 
improvements in the clarification of roles and responsibilities 
 The health sector has clear leadership and strong partnerships with NGOs and donors. 
Health workforce and material capacity is inadequate particularly in times of disaster. 
However, local health professionals are keen to be able to provide care to country but 
required material resources to be able to meet this responsibility.  
 The health sector are often the first responders and first to carry out disaster assessment 
 Some level of disaster training available for the health workforce. Desk top and field 
simulations or training programs are provided annually. Access to training for some levels 
of staff is an issue. 
 
An interviewee from government noted that “[h]ealthcare is mostly nationally funded and 
Red Cross mobilises [their] workers quickly” (DCD). This highlights the collaborative and 
cooperative nature of health sector organisations, including the role of the Red Cross. The 
Red Cross are able to provide health care through a funded program:  
 
“The Pacific Regional Health Program includes… $50,000 a year to do community health 
programs – this includes before, during after disasters ... This includes psychosocial 
support which is a strong link between health and DRM.” 
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The Red Cross also note that when they visit communities,  
 
“We always link in with the hospitals. Most of the time they say they need to upgrade their 
first aid skills. First Aid has to be [about] disaster preparedness and you have to be First 
Aid trained while out in the field. That is a package of the DM [disaster management] 
program  - [it] is first aid training.” (CI Red Cross).  
 
Provision of health care is supported by the pre-positioning of supplies in most of the 
Cook Islands. 
 
In addition to health care provisions in the Cook Islands, the diplomatic ties between the 
Cook Islands and New Zealand have other implications, as noted by New Zealand Aid 
Programme:  
“They [Cook Islanders] are New Zealand citizens they have access to New Zealand 
healthcare.” This is seen as a benefit to Cook Islanders, who can readily access the 
health care they may need by travelling to New Zealand. This ease of access, in addition 
to the other facilities and opportunities available in the New Zealand, is also part of the 
reason why so many Cook Islanders are migrating temporarily or more permanently, to 
New Zealand. Thus, the health workforce (and other sectors) needs to cope with fewer 
personnel. 
4.2 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) 
WASH as an ongoing development issue, as well as a post-disaster need receives the 
greatest attention when compared to the other three humanitarian needs. This is reflected 
by national government interviewees from two sectors: “Water and sanitation is the 
biggest funded [sector]” (DCD) and “Water and sanitation a priority for us here now.” 
(MoIP) 
 
Several key DRS organisations prioritise WASH and are relatively well equipped to source 
materials and trained personnel either internally or externally.  Coordination and 
understanding of roles and responsibilities is also fairly well established, for example the 
National Environment Service considers its role in WASH: “Water and sanitation – in 
terms of water and waste.” (NES) The MoH has some personnel with skills in WASH in 
disasters: 
 
“[For] Water/sanitation, Environmental Officers in the Ministry of Health - they would be on 
the plane [to the disaster area]. Two doctors and nurses [would also be] on the plane.” 
(MoH).  
 
The MoH noted however, that due to financial constraints, they sometimes have to make 
the decision as to whether they send personnel or supplies, as space on the plane and 
the cost of aircraft fuel are limiting factors. 
 
The Ministry of Infrastructure and Planning (MoIP) is a key government agency with a 
focus on WASH infrastructure in disasters and notes:  
 
“In water we have a Water Sanitation unit. [We] also [have] a program with waste 
management under the one program. [There are] lots of linkages with water/ sanitation with 
health, the [National] Environmental Service - we work together on all responses.” (MoIP) 
Red Cross is the key organisation outside of government for WASH and has a specific 
team and equipment dedicated to WASH needs: “Water and sanitation equipment - a unit 
concentrates on just this during and after disasters” (Red Cross). Red Cross receives 
support from regional and global partners in times of disaster as well and it was noted by 
a Police interviewee that at the time of TC Pat:  
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“Red Cross supplies for TC Pat came mainly from NZ Red Cross. This included a lot of 
WASH supplies including a desalination unit” (Police).   
4.3 Food and nutrition 
Immediate food and nutrition needs post-disaster were not raised as a priority amongst 
Cook Island interviewees. The mention of food and nutrition needs usually led 
interviewees to mention longer term food security issues, for example the National 
Environment Service (NES) interviewee noted their role for food and nutrition was “[i]n 
terms of biodiversity and food security”. Furthermore, the NES interviewee noted that 
“[a]fter TC Pat the food was also destroyed; we had recommendations about replanting.” 
Another national government interviewee noted that “[f]ood and nutrition (or Food 
Security) is probably the theme for next year’s Development Partners meeting as it’s 
underfunded but needs more.” (DCD). 
 
The MoH indicated that provision of immediate food needs was not funded by 
government, rather the staff themselves:  
 
“Food / nutrition - before we left to Aititaki [for the TC Pat response] there was a 
contribution [of food] from staff and then we sent the food to Aititaki. Otherwise it's from the 
Red Cross.” (MoH) 
 
The Red Cross noted that in assessing needs post- TC Pat: “The crop food seemed okay 
at this point but this only lasts for 2 weeks.” (Red Cross) This indicates that some of the 
food and nutritional needs can be sustained from crops surviving disaster damage, 
however this does not last long, and so plans need to be in place to meet these needs in 
food requirements. 
4.4 Psychosocial needs 
“People die in the sea [as a result of disasters] and then afterwards people don't want to go in 
and fish because of what they think.” (MoH) 
 
As noted in the Chapter 5, all four case study countries have inadequate capacity to meet 
post-disaster psychosocial needs. This has implications for the affected population as well 
as the ability of health care workers and other community leaders to function effectively in 
times of disasters. One challenge this research identified is uncertain roles and 
responsibilities regarding psychosocial support. An interviewee from the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MoIA) noted that: 
 
“One area of weakness for the ministries was there was an expectation that we [MoIA] 
would have people who can go and counsel, but we don't actually employ counsellors - we 
don't have funds for that.”  
 
After TC Pat, the need for psychosocial support was clear so MoIA was able to find one 
person:  
 
“We [MoIA] had one person who had received some social counselling training so they 
were freed up to go and be part of a team.”  
 
Dedicated and trained personnel were also found to be lacking in the MoH, and MoIA 
noted that as part of the TC Pat response:  
 
“Internal Affairs does not generally provide counselling services, the Ministry of Health has 
primary responsibility for mental health and wellbeing and therefore had some capacity 
through the provision of nurses and doctors.” 
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Together, MoH and MoIA were able to coordinate with a team of counsellors who came 
from New Zealand 3 months after TC Pat to offer psychosocial support. MoH workshop 
participants reported that there is “limited formal counselling. School guardians, mental 
health service in Ministry of Health.” 
 
Given MoIA and MoH were able to meet at least some of the post-disaster psychosocial 
needs, the expectation from other ministries is maintained – that psychosocial needs are 
met by both MoH and MoIA, despite the internal inadequacies that remain in both 
agencies, as noted by the MoIA interviewee:  
 
“Expectations is an important one. Even after, there is still expectations we will provide 
counsellors and we don't have people. So now internally we have to look at how we 
manage those expectations.” 
 
Red Cross interviewees were aware that psychosocial needs were a gap:  
 
“The 2005 [tropical cyclone] event exposed psychosocial needs to be significant. From 
lessons learned it's been recognised counselling etc. needs to be involved. Psych support 
is recognised as needed and included in DRM Plans”.  
 
Part of the gap relates to supporting community and traditional leaders, who are important 
points of contact for incoming support. Traditional leaders, or mayors, are often faced with 
additional role of being the community’s disaster coordinator. As Red Cross noted that for 
TC Pat response:  
 
“First point of contact was [the disaster] coordinator, who is the Mayor of the island. His 
first comment was he was not up to it, so we knew we needed another coordinator 
because he has been traumatised, he was distressed, he had not been able to get back to 
where he should be. So we decided we needed a coordinator to help”. 
 
Support is needed for communities affected by disasters, including key community 
leaders, as well as those offering the support, who can be faced with the situation of 
needing to offer comfort to their own communities while in distress themselves. One 
interviewee noted that of the research’s four humanitarian needs, the first three are more 
tangible, while psychosocial needs are more difficult to understand and address. This 
remains a challenge in the Cook Islands despite being recognised as a need since 2005 
at least. 
5. KEY DETERMINANTS OF ADAPTIVE CAPACITY IN 
COOK ISLANDS 
Analysis of field results (both interviews and workshop results) and supplementary 
literature were analysed and interrogated to identify the key determinants of adaptive 
capacity of the Cook Islands’ DRS.  
 
Four key determinants adaptive capacity found to be most influential (in order of 
significance): 1) Communications and relationships; 2) Leadership, management and 
governance; 3) Capacity and 4) Risk perceptions.  
 
As a country with such a small population and with a scattered population across vast 
distances, key individuals and their relationships and trust were crucial determinants of 
adaptive capacity. This issue permeated the other key determinants, with positions of 
leadership and the governance of the DRS supported by a few personnel. These few 
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people’s perceptions of risk were seen to drive the progress and pathway towards efforts 
of risk reduction and addressing key issues surrounding resilience.  
5.1 Communications, relationships, information and knowledge 
In the context of this research, communications and relationships (McManus et al., 2007) 
relate to accountability (Biermann, 2007). This means that governance that is credible, 
stable and inclusive must be considered to be legitimate by all stakeholders, and is held 
accountable for its actions and representatives by its constituencies. Trust is developed 
between governance systems, their stakeholders and constituents when they are found to 
be credible, stable, inclusive and accountable. The creation of effective communications 
pathways based on mutually respectful relationships is critical. Closely related to this 
concept is information and knowledge; the dissemination and retention of which forms part 
of the adaptive capacity of an organisation (McManus et al., 2008). The capacity to apply 
current knowledge to a situation in a creative manner and assigning roles, and the ability 
of subsets of an organisation to assume responsibilities of absent members are 
considered adaptive features of an organisation. 
 
This determinant was observed to both support and constrain adaptive capacity in the 
Cook Islands in different ways. Firstly, the geographical nature of the Cook Islands, with 
its main centre in Rarotonga and small and scattered population across outer islands, 
provides a challenging environment in which to manage disaster response. Logistically, 
communications are difficult with outer islands in times of disaster, as noted by a Cook 
Islands Police interviewee with regard to communicating with affected population in times 
of disasters: “Communications [are] still the biggest challenge. Once comms are lost, it is 
just a waiting game”. Efforts to overcome this challenge have focused on disaster 
preparedness and DRR so the population can cope without immediate assistance; this is 
described in further detail in Section 8.4.4 (Risk perceptions).  
 
The small population is seen as a strength to some, and a constraint to others. For 
example, an New Zealand Aid Programme interviewee notes that “[s]ize helps. It’s a small 
place, you can’t come on the island without people knowing you are here”. A small 
population could be seen to support adaptive capacity if everyone knows who is who and 
how they fit into the DRS. However, small populations also mean low institutional 
capacity, as raised by New Zealand Aid Programme: “Because of their size, we are 
relying on individuals rather than institutions so if a  strong person goes then you lose a 
lot.” Population decline was reported as an issue by several interviewees from a range of 
sectors. The loss of skilled personnel is discussed below (Section 8.4.3, Capacity). 
 
Ministry of Health interviewees noted that the management of disaster response: 
 
“[is] personality driven. If there is someone good on the [disaster] committee then we are 
represented and it [information] filters back”.  
 
This emphasis on the importance of key individuals was also highlighted by a NES 
interviewee:  
 
“The [NES] director is key as he knows the people on the [Disaster] Council and has 
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These quotes provides examples of the importance key people, and the formal and 
informal roles they play, in supporting adaptive capacity of the DRS. With the right people 
in the right roles who are connected to the right people, information can flow to those who 
need it. In terms of the importance of informal communications, nurses present at the 
workshop noted that discussion and incorporation of lessons learned after a disaster 
happens informally. 
 
An example of where the lack of a relationship has limited the inclusion of an organisation 
in the DRS is that of the Cook Islands Civil Society Organisations (CICSO), which is the 
newly established umbrella group of civil society and non-government organisations. A 
CICSO interviewee notes that:  
 
“There is a definite lack of relationship between government and CICSO so national 
policies are not relevant to us. The policies do not come down to us… We want to partner 
with them [Government] and be able to provide input where we have relevant knowledge, 
skills and experience – and contacts / networks. We want to be part of the consultation 
process.”  
 
This shows that without the relationship with government (or key individuals within 
government), the ability of CICSO to participate in the DRS is limited and from CICSO’s 
perspective, the governance of the DRS lacks credibility given its limited inclusiveness. It 
would therefore be worthwhile for both government and CICSO to work towards 
developing ways to work together, given the mutually beneficial partnership and feelings 
of legitimacy and credibility this may lead to, particularly with regard to disaster response. 
 
The concept and importance of trust in these relationships was also crucial in the Cook 
Islands where the DRS is comprised of relatively few people. When asked about the key 
skills people need to manage the response to disasters, a government interviewee 
responded:  
 
“We need people who are good relationship managers, so a level of trust is maintained at a 
high level. So when an emergency happens we can sit down and make quick decisions. 
[We] have to deal with politics to get resources out there, you have to go through channels 
and respect local decision making systems so staff need to understand these politics.”  
 
This response highlights that above other skills, relationship management and 
understanding formal and informal modes of operating is crucial.  
 
Informal modes of operating include the way in which communications are often through 
word of mouth in times of disaster, for example: “We are relying on family and friends 
networks. We walk around if the phones go down” (Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Planning). So long as close relationships are maintained, this system can support 
adaptive capacity. However if key individuals or communities are left out of this method of 
communication, their ability to be kept informed, and therefore prepare or respond 
appropriately, is limited. 
 
Another informal (or unofficial) mode of operating relates to the unwritten understanding 
that Red Cross personnel are included on the team conducting initial disaster 
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“It's not a written arrangement, it's verbal, that the first flight that goes out a Red Cross 
person is to go. So far [it is] being observed … it's just been happening - it's not yet written 
as a policy. But it wouldn't hurt, because people come and go” (Red Cross).  
 
Red Cross recognised, perhaps as a result of the interview questions, that their inclusion 
on the government’s initial disaster assessment team was based on an “understanding” 
rather than a policy. So long as key individuals involved in decision making understand 
this, as mentioned in the quote, this process will continue. However with high staff 
turnover and population decline, the lack of formal agreement has the potential to limit 
Red Cross inclusion in the future. 
 
In summary, communications, relationships, information and knowledge in the Cook 
Islands centre around personal relationships and trust between key individuals, which is 
particularly pertinent given the small population. Adaptive capacity can be supported by 
this key determinant so long as key individuals within the DRS have a clear understanding 
of the roles and responsibilities of others and information flows are unobstructed. Informal 
modes of operating within this system are important and also rely heavily on the existence 
of trust and strong relationships.  
5.2 Leadership, management and governance 
The quality of leadership and degree of empowerment of staff is critical for an adaptive 
culture (McManus et al., 2008). Strength of leadership across the Cook Islands DRS 
organisations was found to vary. As noted in Chapter 5, there is clear leadership within 
the health sector and strong partnerships exist with NGOs and donors. Red Cross in the 
Cook Islands also provides strong leadership in times of disaster, and has a solid 
reputation in delivering critical support to disaster affected communities. As a result, Red 
Cross enjoys some support from government, and it was reported the Government had a 
building specially built for them.  
 
The central government has shown leadership in the establishment of the Climate Change 
Office which sits within the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), as noted by a staff 
member:  
 
“Government is taking a bold step with establishing the Climate Change Office. It’s a good 
step to coordinate better and recognises the need to improve synergies and results”.  
 
Emergency Management Cook Islands (EMCI – the equivalent to NDMOs in other PICs) 
has also been recently shifted to the OPM, and an EMCI interviewee notes “[i]t is good 
politically to be under the Office of the PM”. Furthermore, as a result of past events:  
 
“The government is being very supportive. I guess after Cyclone Pat there is probably a 
rude awakening for the previous government and then they started putting things together 
and then the new government that came on are very supportive especially having the PM 
and drove lots of things here. It’s good that we have a government that support our work.”  
 
Despite this support for the leadership of EMCI, capacity to fulfil its coordination 
obligations remain limited (see next section). This highlights the need for leadership to be 
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The vast majority of Cook Islands interviewees acknowledged the leadership of EMCI in 
terms of their role in coordination of disaster response. There was uncertainty, however, in 
the broader leadership of decision makers, including who and how external assistance is 
requested and who is included on key decision making bodies. Regarding the latter issue 
in relation to decision making for the TC Pat response, an interviewee from government 
noted, “[t]here were too many chiefs. So that caused a lot of delays especially in terms of 
emergency response”. EMCI also recognised the need to limit numbers on key decision 
making bodies because “[t]he last thing we need is having this huge number of people in 
the operation room so you can get a decision made”. Some flexibility exists in terms of the 
stakeholders involved in decision making, as noted by EMCI: “The Response Executive is 
a part of the Operation Team, depending on the disaster [it] can add people to the 
Executive.” While this shows a degree of adaptiveness and flexibility, evidence from past 
events shows that clearer guidelines are needed to ensure decisions can be made 
quickly. This too was pointed out by a government interviewee:  
 
“It's important to have key people that know what to do… that people are recognised as 
leaders in those circumstances”. 
 
This lack of clarity in leadership on decision making bodies extended overall governance 
mechanisms in times of disaster. As noted by a Cook Islands interviewee:  
 
“On paper there are processes, but as in most Pacific island countries, the Cooks 
Government is known for its decisions to be made ad-hoc in times of disaster. It isn’t about 
who shouts the loudest, but this government can find it convenient to forget procedures in 
times of crisis.”  
 
Such procedures being “forgotten” may be the result of policies, plans and SOPs being 
inappropriate in times of disaster – perhaps too rigid, unspecific and vague, or developed 
without adequate consultation. Inclusion of traditional leaders and how this leadership is 
managed in times of disaster led to much discussion amongst workshop participants, 
including one comment that:  
 
“It’s a fight of who is in charge in outer islands – the secretary, the traditional chief, mayor, 
member of parliament etc etc… and their wives”.  
 
This reflects the need for a flexible approach to including and communicating with local 
government and leaders in outer islands. 
 
An example of misunderstanding of the disaster response procedures at the time of TC 
Pat was revealed by EMCI, in terms of how the MoH responded:  
 
“It’s us [EMCI] that activate the response; any request that comes from the outer islands 
comes through us. But what happened was the health people [in Aitutaki] were liaising 
directly to their people over here [in Rarotonga] and bypassing the system … they thought 
they could just go ahead and order the stuff, then they realise that they couldn’t do it unless 
to us and formally through the government. Eventually we ironed out all of those 
communication issues.”  
 
This example reveals that MoH were likely responding according to their own procedures, 
where roles and responsibilities have been clarified (as noted in Chapter 5). The 
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miscommunication between EMCI and MoH could therefore be the result of limited ability 
of EMCI in communicating national disaster procedures to other sectors, or high staff 
turnover, which was revealed to lead to limited knowledge of policies (see Chapter 5). 
 
This issue of miscommunication had implications for the coordination of disaster 
assessments for the TC Pat response. A Cook Islands interviewee noted that: 
 
“People felt they needed to “see for themselves” – for example those in different 
government departments, rather than rely on previous assessments. As a result, numerous 
assessments were conducted”.  
 
This feeling of lack of coordination for disaster assessments was echoed by several Cook 
Islands interviewees and workshop participants, highlighting the need for a clearly 
developed approach to conducting and sharing results of disaster assessments. This 
understanding and coordination is needed for external organisations offering assistance 
too, as noted by an NES interviewee: “Overseas organisations want to help but don’t 
know how, so they do an assessment.” As described in Chapter 4, it is important to have 
clearly understood roles and responsibilities of all DRS agents (including those from 
overseas) to ensure efficiency in response and minimised duplication of efforts. Adaptive 
capacity can be enhanced with a streamlined process for disaster assessments, as 
support can be provided quicker, reducing potential medium to longer term impacts. 
 
Effective leadership in the Cook Islands is important for efficiency in disaster response 
and adaptive capacity in the uncertainty presented by climate change. Key DRS decision 
making bodies need to be comprised of individuals who are recognised as leaders. This 
acknowledgement of leadership is in part dependent on the relationships and levels of 
trust between individuals, as described in the previous section. Effective leadership is also 
dependent on the capacity of individuals (or organisations) to fulfil their obligations.   
5.3 Capacity (human resource, financial and technical) 
The extent of an organisation’s access to various assets and how they are utilised to 
expand adaptive capacity is an important determinant. Financial assets include funding 
available to organisations undertaking disaster management (DRR, preparedness and 
response), whilst human resources include the skills and knowledge of staff related to 
disaster management. Defining the technical capacity in a disaster response system is 
important for understanding how the system functions, how monitoring / evaluation of 
response outcomes is undertaken for identifying gaps for future exploration and analysis, 
and the capacity to adapt to unforseen stresses such as climate change impacts. 
 
As a key determinant of adaptive capacity in the Cook Islands, capacity (in terms of 
human, financial and technical resources) was found to generally constrain adaptive 
capacity due to limitations to access to a range of assets. Perceptions of levels of 
capacity, and what is considered adequate, varied amongst research participants. This 
was made clear in a workshop activity which focused on obtaining the views of 
participants on levels of capacity of various organisations within the DRS. The activity 
focused on coordination, human resources and skills and exposed interesting views. 
Whereas severe constraints in human resource capacity were mentioned in interviews, 
participants in this exercise gave some organisations relatively high scores for human 
resources, e.g. the MoH received scores of 3 and 4, Red Cross received 3 and 5, while 
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Police (key in immediate disaster coordination) received 2.5 and 5. The MoH scores are 
perhaps the most surprising in light of staff shortages. However, it may point to the Cook 
Islanders wanting to draw on all of their own capacity first. It was mentioned several times 
that they wanted to look after their own people prior to requesting external assistance. To 
be able to do this they need material resources. For example, the WHO CC have been 
working on re-establishing the School of Nursing to be able to produce more local 
educated nurses.  Full results are provided in Appendix 9.    
 
Inherent in the capacity challenge is the small population of the Cook Islands, which a 
government interviewee acknowledged: “In a small island state, we will never have all the 
technical skills.” Key DRS organisations, such as EMCI who are the coordinating body for 
disaster risk management, only have two staff. This limited human resource capacity 
constrains their ability to fulfil their leadership and coordination role, and therefore has 
implications for the adaptive capacity of the DRS in the Cook Islands.  
 
Accessing training, which is often delivered overseas, is difficult when staff are needed to 
perform their daily duties, as noted by workshop participants in terms of prioritising needs, 
and also a Met Service interviewee: “Training is out of country a lot. The maximum we can 
send is two staff because they’re needed here.” Capacity building in-country was identified 
as a priority, and needs to be incorporated as a matter of course, as highlighted by a 
Climate Change Office interviewee, regarding CCA projects:  
 
“There is not much use having developed countries funding CCA projects to be prepared 
for DRM [disaster risk management] if there’s no component for capacity building.”  
 
It was also noted that the small numbers of staff in organisations: 
 
“Makes capability and capacity development building tricky because you’re building 
capacity of individuals not institutions” (Cook Islands New Zealand Aid Programme). 
 
Interviewees also reported that this can lead to a loss of institutional knowledge, because 
“[i]f a strong person goes, then you lose a lot.” (Cook Islands New Zealand Aid 
Programme). The challenge of limited human resources and technical capacity was found 
to be occurring as a result of outward migration, as noted by a Met Services interviewee:  
 
“We have a lack of skilled personnel mainly because of outward migration. It’s not as we 
want it. There needs to be a policy to be created by government to have some incentive to 
keep skilled people.”  
 
Implications of limited human resource and technical flow on to the ability to implement 
programs, as reported by EMCI:  
 
“[i]n terms of the donor funding - there’s a lot of funds there. The challenge there is we 
don’t have the capacity to implement a lot of these things.”  
 
Adaptive capacity is therefore clearly constrained by the limited ability to make use of 
available funds for CCA programs. 
 
Limited financial capacity was an issue raised by most interviewees, for example these 
quotes from government interviewees: “Funding capacity is a core issue” and “Money is 
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more an issue than finding people who can do the work”. The financial capacity to cope 
with immediate disaster response has recently been boosted in the Cook Islands with the 
establishment of a Disaster Trust Fund of NZ$200,000, as described by a government 
interviewee:  
 
“There has been money appropriated into a Disaster Trust Fund which can be directed 
immediately. [It is] not a big fund but allows money to be freed up immediately.”  
 
This was developed as a learning from past events, which revealed the limited ability of 
government ministries to respond due to severe funding constraints. Not all interviewees 
(both government and non-government) were aware of the Disaster Trust Fund, indicating 
that communication of its existence, and understanding of the ability to draw from it, still 
requires broader communication. Workshop participants raised the point that some funds 
would be better invested into preparedness activities, rather than keeping all funds for 
response.  
 
Similarly, not all interview and workshop participants were aware of the recently 
developed Joint National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change 
Adaptation (JNAP – see Government of the Cook Islands, 2012). Despite EMCI, the 
Climate Change Office and other holding this document in high regard as the key guiding 
document for climate change and disaster planning, several research participants were 
unaware of its existence. The issue of limited capacity was once again raised as the 
reason for this, as few staff and funding provisions were provided for wide stakeholder 
consultation. A workshop participant noted that:  
 
“We have to question whether it [the JNAP] is of any use. If it sits on the shelf there is no 
use doing it. You have to get the right buy in to make it useful.” 
 
As reported in Chapter 5, the Cook Islands health workforce and material capacity is 
inadequate, particularly in times of disaster. In most disaster situations, health sector 
capacity is managed by drawing personnel from one area of the MoH to assist in another 
area, mainly from Rarotonga, where the majority of workforce is located. Workshop 
participants noted that “[t]here is no budget to increase the workforce, retired nurses have 
to come on board to assist. [It is] all hands on deck”. The chronic lack of financial 
resources, however, affects the delivery of health services in times of disasters, especially 
to other islands.  
 
“Without funding we can send 8 or 9 [personnel], because we can charter a flight; but 
without medication. With more funding we can take more staff and medicines”.  
 
The MoH felt that they could cope with a minor disaster. However there is a lack of the 
infrastructure, transport, supplies, and staff to cope with a large scale disaster.  
 
“Thinking about when we [are] hit by a big disaster, how can we manage: I don't know 
where we will get all these people, and we don't have enough beds in the wards, so we 
can't manage. We will need people to come in and assist us” (CI-MOH). 
 
Cook Islands Red Cross take a pragmatic approach to their limited resources, as noted by 
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“We use what resources we have – money and connections – to make things happen, and 
we have become clever about this over the years. We don't say we don't have money, we 
can't do it, we find what we have to make things happen”.  
 
Part of the Red Cross’s approach is to recognise connections between issues – for 
example disaster management and health at the community level. The Pacific Regional 
Health Program, for which the Red Cross has funding, therefore incorporates a disaster 
management angle. 
 
Capacity challenges in the Cook Islands DRS provide a significant challenge to efficiency 
in disaster response, and constrain the adaptive capacity of the DRS, given the challenge 
in addressing current risk. Some capacity issues have been addressed in recent years, 
e.g. immediate financial capacity through the Disaster Trust Fund. However, a future 
focus towards capacity building across all sectors needs to be mainstreamed, with 
innovative approaches sought to ensure skills are not lost when key individuals move on. 
The flexible use of the Disaster Trust Fund (using it for DRR or disaster preparedness) 
was identified as a way to enact a future focus on disaster response. External assistance 
in times of disaster should acknowledge capacity (both existing and gaps) and always act 
to build skills, experience and knowledge throughout all stages of the disaster 
management cycle. 
5.4 Risk perceptions 
This subjective determinant examining perceptions relates to an organisation’s 
understanding of the risks of climate change and the likely impacts on their disaster 
response processes. “Perceived adaptation efficacy” refers to an organisation’s belief in 
the effectiveness of adaptation actions and perceived adaptation costs refers to the 
organisation’s assumed costs (inclusive of monetary, personal time, effort) of undertaking 
the actions (Ekstom et al., 2012; Kuruppu et al., 2011).  
 
While risk perceptions were generally similar across organisations in the Cook Islands 
DRS, the degree to which risk reduction measures were implemented (e.g. policy 
development, technical upskilling and relocation of risk prone infrastructure) was 
constrained by human resource, technical and financial capacity, as described in the 
previous section. 
 
There was general consensus amongst Cook Islands interviewees that risk reduction and 
disaster preparedness are important, for example, an EMCI interviewee made this clear:  
 
“If people are focused on disaster risk reduction then there is a possibility that there will be 
no disaster. That will make our work easy. If they don’t do their jobs, then there will 
definitely be a disaster. And in terms of preparedness I am 100% behind that I think we 
should be prepared at all times”.  
 
Part of “doing their jobs” involves government ministries having a disaster risk 
management plan, which describes internal roles and responsibilities for times of disaster. 
These ministry disaster plans are a requirement under the Disaster Risk Management Act 
2007; however, some government ministry’s plans have not yet been developed, remain 
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“[w]e don’t have a Disaster Response Plan for our office. We have been talking about it, we 
know what to do but it’s not written down.” 
 
 Workshop participants also agreed on the importance of Disaster Response Plans, as 
they provide details of what to do and where to go. This reveals that despite organisations 
and individuals saying they acknowledge the importance of risk reduction and 
preparedness, actions are sometimes limited in putting these words into practice. EMCI 
voiced some frustrations in obtaining buy-in from other government agencies:  
 
“There is lot of preparation on our behalf and to me there was – not a failure – but it was a 
bit more challenging to get our agencies to respond as soon as we would like to.”  
 
Prioritisation of implementing preparedness actions is needed to support adaptive 
capacity of the DRS, especially since the Cook Islands DRS is dependent on few people, 
meaning that all individuals need to understand their (and each other’s) roles and 
responsibilities in times of disaster response. 
 
Most interviewees were aware that climate change had the potential to affect the 
frequency and severity of severe weather events, including tropical cyclones, with an 
interviewee from the Met Service reporting:  
 
“There may be fewer cyclones but those that happen are likely to be more intense. So we 
need some new policies to cater for those events also conveyed across to the remote 
areas.”  
 
Interviews revealed that it was not only climate change experts who were incorporating 
climate change into policies, as a MoH interviewee noted that:  
 
“It used to be just emergency and disaster, now we have talked about climate change. We 
never used to think of climate change affecting health but now we see it does. Even our 
strategic plan has a component of climate change and health and what's our response to 
it.”  
 
While not always explicitly mentioned, climate change considerations were found to be 
incorporated where possible:  
 
“There’s no specific reference to climate change but if you’re building a clinic then they are 
now being built to withstand higher categories [of tropical cyclones]” (MoFA).  
 
There were of course limitations in relocating existing buildings, an issue raised by several 
interviewees, particularly the Met Service who note, regarding their building’s location (on 
the waterfront): “There has been talk in government to relocate.” 
 
Climate change and its impacts were raised by several interviewees as one of a number 
of pressing issues for the Cook Islands. For example, two government interviewees noted 
that: “Climate change isn’t THE issue. It’s part of the problem” and  
 
“What’s relevant here is a move to work towards livelihoods, then they [communities] have 
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Another interviewee noted strongly that “[t]here is almost no need to talk about climate 
change as we are not even managing current risk”; while a workshop participant noted 
that “[w]e need to invest in things to do today, [more] than things that need to be done in 
the future”. Broader development planning was also raised as an important factor, with 
one Cook Islands interviewee noting that:  
 
“People understand risks will increase with climate change. But risks are already 
increasing because of poor planning”.  
 
The perception of climate change and disaster risk was seen by some interviewees 
alongside development challenges, and one which could not be managed in isolation.  
 
The perceptions of disaster risk and climate change are relatively consistent across the 
Cook Islands DRS. Most agree that climate change is shifting the baseline risk to a world 
with potentially more unpredictable and severe weather. What differs across the DRS is 
the degree to which this perception of risk has led to actions to reduce risk. Those more 
directly related to the issue (e.g. EMCI and the Met Service) have the advantage of risk 
being core to their work. Other sectors believe themselves to be more distanced from the 
issue, thus less concerned about taking steps to develop policy or plans for disaster 
response. Adaptive capacity is therefore somewhat constrained, as all stakeholders are 
not (for various reasons) prioritising risk reduction and preparedness as part of their work. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The key determinants of adaptive capacity for the Cook Islands that were found to be 
most significant were strongly related to each other and included communications, 
relationships, information and knowledge; leadership, management and governance; 
capacity and risk perceptions. As for other case study countries and across the regional 
DRS, relationships and trust were key to an effective and adaptable system of disaster 
response in the Cook Islands. With low institutional capacity due to a small population, 
efficiency in disaster response requires the smooth flow of information between 
responding agencies, and these responding agencies need an understanding of the 
formal and informal modes of operating. If relationships are strong, then agents within the 
DRS are aware of each other’s roles, responsibilities, capacity and gaps, which in turn 
lead to a legitimate and credible governance structure. Incoming support to the Cook 
Islands in times of disaster also need an awareness of the modes of operating, including 
issues surrounding culture and traditional governance structures. By doing so, external 
assistance can work towards building adaptive capacity in ways which are more 
sustainable and aligned with Cook Islands cultural practices.  
 
Past events have revealed some gaps in the capacity and coordination of the Cook 
Islands’ DRS, and some steps have been taken to overcome them, for example the 
establishment of the Disaster Trust Fund. The capacity of the health sector is highly 
constrained in times of disasters, however, it was clear that Cook Islanders are keen to 
draw on the capacity they have and be supported by external assistance only when gaps 
are evident. Leadership of key responding bodies, such as EMCI, is crucial for future 
adaptive capacity, however capacity constrains the ability of some organisations to take 
necessary steps in implementing important initiatives. Policies and plans are needed to 
ensure disaster response efforts (including disaster assessments) are appropriately 
coordinated, however some flexibility is needed given the nature of disasters. Such 
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policies and plans need adequate consultation of all relevant stakeholders to ensure a 
collective level of ownership exists, resulting in an inclusive and collaborative DRS. 
 
Specific recommendations for the Cook Islands include the following: 
 MoH (with the support of donors and international organisations) to ensure that 
clear guidelines are in place for in-coming personnel to be registered to facilitate 
efficient and effective HRH management, immigration and customs processes in 
each country. 
 NDMO to ensure systems are in place to facilitate a structured post-disaster 
debrief that encourages a feedback of lessons learned from all agencies into 
national policy and planning processes.  
 Communication and coordination between the MoH and other DRS organisations 
needs to be strengthened with a view to improve effectiveness and efficiency of 
disaster response.  
 NDMOs to work towards improved coordination of capacity building of technical 
upskilling and training programmes (aligned with UNOCHA’s own 
recommendations). This is to include needs based content and systematic 
selection of participants.  
 MoH to lead (supported by of Australian and regional / international organisations) 
an urgent comprehensive assessment, including further research, of psychosocial 
support needs and technical capacity in each of the case study PICs, both in terms 
of affected populations, health providers and other first respondents to disasters.  
 MoH/National Health Services (supported by Australian and regional / international 
organisations including WHO) to develop a strategic plan addressing emergent 
findings from assessments of psychosocial support capacity. This will ensure that 
adequate consideration and provisions are made regarding the specific 
psychosocial needs of the affected population, health worker support and disaster 
response personnel.  
 MoH should ensure that adequate considerations are given to HRH needs for 
disaster response under a changing climate, in any new or revised National Health 
Plans or HRH strategic policies.  
 DRS to seek the support of development partners for the assessment of how the 
health workforce capacity can be improved in terms of numbers, skills and 
competencies in the context of more frequent intense disasters.   
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